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Abstract 
This study is concerned with a great socio-economic experiment in history that replaced the 
naturally evolved market economy with the humanly designed command economy to achieve a 
socialist triumph over capitalism, experienced a setback and ultimately returned to the market 
economy for managing the material aspects of the society. Efforts to open the subject economies in 
the aftermath of the said experiment are on the contemporary agenda worldwide. Yet, the past pulls 
the present causing hysteresis that thwarts the momentum of globalization.  
Using KOF and AEMC indices of globalization (based on KOF data 1991-2014), the paper concludes 
that most of the countries to the south of Russian Federation (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan) have performed rather poorly in globalization efforts. On the other hand, 
the countries in the north-western side of the Russian Federation (except Moldova) have on the 
whole performed better. In comparison, China has performed fairly while India lags behind. In spite 
of all proclamations, unless the political will to globalization is there, globalization cannot progress 
much further. However, such a political will has not been strong in India. India has remained 
protectionist of vested interests of politicians, industrialists, business houses and perhaps the 
intelligentsia, a coalition of the dominant proprietary classes that benefit from the status quo or 
stagnancy of the Indian economy and society. Globalization in India is under a strong spell of 
hysteresis on account of the pre-1991 pseudo-socialistic nostalgia as well as age-old internal 
contradictions. 
Keywords: Globalization; KOF index; equi-marginal; Shapley value; global optimization, China, India, 
Eastern Bloc 
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1. Introduction: This study is concerned with a great socio-economic experiment in history that 
replaced the naturally evolved market economy with the humanly designed command economy to 
achieve a socialist triumph over capitalism, experienced a setback and ultimately returned to the 
market economy for managing the material aspects of the society. Efforts to open the subject 
economies in the aftermath of the said experiment are on the contemporary agenda worldwide. Yet, 
the past pulls the present causing hysteresis that thwarts the momentum of globalization.      
2. Is market a desirable institution? Almost entire body of modern economic theory since Adam 
Smith, whether orthodox or heterodox, is the documented record of arguments raised either in 
favour of or against the motion that market economy (although operating on selfish interests and 
perhaps Smith’s moral sentiments) would sustain itself and also deliver stability, efficiency, justice, 
growth, and survival to the members of the society.  The orthodox economists summarily and 
optimistically affirmed that the market economy, with or without some state intervention 
(refereeing), would deliver all that. The heterodox economists, notably Karl Marx, denied the market 
economy of all lofty attributes, arguing that it would not be able to resist to concentration of 
politico-economic powers in a tiny few hands coupled with the misery of the rest of the mass, 
resulting into inefficiency, injustice, stagnation, instability and ultimate collapse of the said economic 
system.  The economic arguments - the understanding - led Marx to derive the active political 
conclusion - of changing the world - by establishment of the communist regime, the dictatorship of 
the proletariat, which would deliver ‘the bungled and the botched’ out from misery and injustice. 
3. The greatest socio-economic experiment in history – establishment of the USSR: The socio-
economic and political conditions in Russia during the second half of the nineteenth century and 
afterwards gradually came to be ripe for the experiment on establishing a socio-economic and 
political system akin to Marx’s vision. The Tsars were the absolute rulers of Russia, a country of 
peasants living in communes in which they cultivated (did not own) land for a period allotted to 
them by the commune administrators mostly under the local customs. The peasants had little 
opportunity to develop respect for private property or any of the other qualities necessary for 
citizenship. Politically they tended towards primitive anarchism. To some extent this also held true 
for industrial workers, some two million strong in number, out-migrating from the village 
(Britannica, 2017). Although the Tzars were absolutely autocratic rulers above the law or any 
constitutional restraints who ruled Russia with the help of a bureaucratic caste and the army, 
denying participation of the subject population in governance, they promoted education and 
industry in the country. Increase in education led to the emergence of the intelligentsia. The 
intelligentsia, irrespective of their contrasting attitudes to the approach to bring about changes, 
were eager and active to alter the socio-political conditions. The period 1905-1916 was markedly 
tumultuous with the incidents of peasant revolts organized by the intelligentsia while the rulers 
ruthlessly suppressed such revolts or entertained the subjects with palliatives. The World War-I and 
the resultant decadence of Russia weakened the grip of the rulers on their subjects. At that time 
three political organizations were actively engaged against the rulers. The Socialist Revolutionary 
Party was largely anarchic and indulged in terror and mass killing. The Mensheviks (although a 
majority) rejected the suitability of any great upheaval and considered Russian conditions premature 
for political revolution. However, the Bolsheviks (although a minority), who were highly disciplined 
and led by capable leaders, Lenin and Trotsky to name, went ahead to give a thrust to mass 
revolution, coupe and seize the power in October 1917. It established the dictatorship of the 
Bolsheviks, later in March 2018 renamed as the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), which claimed 
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to be a practical realization of Marx’s dictatorship of the proletariat. Following a civil war, in 1922, 
USSR was formed that constituted of 15 states.   
The great socio-economic experiment in history began with a fatal conceit, treading on a road to 
serfdom (Hayek, 1988; 1944). First it went on to destroy the institution of private property and 
establish a centralized communist economy through nationalization of all the means of production 
(except land) and transportation, the abolition of money and its replacement by barter tokens as 
well as free goods and services, the imposition on the national economy of a single plan, and the 
introduction of compulsory labour. Management of the economy was entrusted to a gigantic 
bureaucratic organization, the Supreme Council of the National Economy, which was to allocate 
human and material resources in the most rational manner (Britannica, 2017). 
4. Two polar systems of resource allocation and economic management: There can be two 
alternative mechanisms at opposite poles to allocate resources for production and consumption, 
which work under two different systems of resource ownership. The first, or the market economy, is 
a system of socio-economic organization that presumes private ownership of resources (plus the 
minimal public ownership of resources utmost necessary). Right to property and market evolved 
gradually as a result of natural selection. Market provides different economic agents opportunities 
to voluntarily exchange their belongings at some ratio of exchange, which when expressed in terms 
of money, is called price. Prices contain information that induces the economic agents to allocate 
their resources for raising or procuring what they will. The economic information is distributed 
among the agents while any particular agent (individual or group) has only a partial knowledge 
(dispersed knowledge). The market, however, is wiser than any individual. It synthesizes information 
in the form of the price system that provides incentives and signals to different individuals so 
effectively as to ensure optimal allocation of resources resulting into stability, justice, growth, etc. in 
the economic system. This is what Adam Smith tried to indicate by his ‘invisible hand’.    
At the other pole and in contrast to the market economy, the command economy is a system of 
socio-economic organization that presumes public ownership of resources at large (plus the minimal 
private ownership utmost necessary). Allocation of resources is administratively made. The 
administrative machinery is hierarchical in nature that collect, share and use information at different 
levels to allocate productive resources to turn out different goods and services to be distributed by 
rationing and quota system. Such decisions are authoritative in nature. Thus, in a command 
economy the market mechanism is replaced by the top-down hierarchical administrative system.     
The management of an economy by the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ nevertheless has some 
unmitigated problems. First of all, the large body of the proletariat must be represented by a few 
persons, arranged in a tree (hierarchical) structure and those representatives feel, gather, filter, 
assess, synthesize and pass on information both ways, up and down the hierarchy. Those persons 
must have impersonal interest unshakable by personal biases and yet they must have compassion 
for their fellow beings. In a way, such representatives must have in them the elements of a 
benevolent dictator or a philosopher king. Secondly, the representatives of the proletariat must be 
able to strike a proper balance among the conflicting objectives. Thirdly, the administrative system 
must be able to gather, analyse and synthesize information at the central top level to solve the 
economic calculation problem.  
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5. The economic calculation problem:  The economic calculation problem is the assertion that any 
apparatus of human gatherers, screeners, analysts and synthesizers of economic information cannot 
carry out enough calculations to arrive at decisions that are needed for optimal allocation of 
resources in a complex organization like an economy. The issue was raised and elaborated by Mises 
(1920). Monetary evaluation, financial market, pricing, entrepreneurship and coherent central 
planning were considered as the fundamental basic requirements for economic calculation. Hayek 
(1945) visualized the requirement of coherence in economic planning for economic calculation 
problem amounting to transmission and use of dispersed knowledge by arguing that it is impossible 
for any individual or a group of individuals to make use of dispersed information possessed by other 
individuals effectively and optimally to arrive at decisions because such dispersed knowledge cannot 
be transmitted in totality.   
In a rudimentary way, the Input-Output analysis initiated by some Soviet economists (Belykh, 1989) 
and formalized by Leontief (1936) provided the opposite view. It showed that given the inter-
industrial input-output relations (technical coefficient matrix) and the final (consumption) demand 
to be met for the output of each industry, it is possible to determine the quantum of output of each 
industry and accordingly primary inputs could be applied to the production of those output (Ghosh, 
1958). Fixed technical coefficients are acceptable approximations for a short run. 
On a different level, Roemer (2016) rebuts the indissolubility of the economic computation problem 
indicating that the SFEcon algorithm “controls the continuum of all chaotic physical and financial 
states, as well as disequilibrium prices, by which an economic system might efficiently guide itself 
into a new, previously unknown, unique, and equi-final Pareto optimum.” Further he observes that 
“the economic calculation problem is precisely one of understanding how partial, distributed 
knowledge can organize itself even though it cannot possibly be assembled at a single point nor 
reacted-upon via instructions from any sort of central directorate. The notion of central direction is 
most especially ridiculous in its requirement that ever-changing economic factoids would have to 
arrive at their point of focus continuously, their implications calculated instantly, and then given 
expression with military punctilio.” By citing the emergence of macro-level organizations in nature 
(such as bee-hive or ant-colony) as a consequence of individuals short of knowledge as to the 
purpose of the organization as well as a command from the top, Roemer asserted that the basic 
requirements for optimal decisions as envisioned by Mises and others were not necessary. Yet, 
Roemer only refutes the impossibility of resolution of the economic calculation problem bereft of 
the fundamental basic requirements, but he does not ensure that the administrative apparatus of a 
command economy will be able to carry out necessary calculation to arrive at optimal decisions.  
6. The rise of Stalinism: Lenin’s health started falling from 1921 and he died (in 1924) soon after the 
formation of the USSR. From 1921 onwards the leadership started slipping into the hands of Stalin 
and finally it came to him. Trotsky, who did not support the increasing bureaucracy and dictatorial 
manners of Stalin in determining the matters of utmost economic as well as political importance, 
was gradually  sidelined and ultimately sent to exile. Stalinist policies in the Soviet Union included 
rapid industrialization, the theory of socialism in one country, a centralized state, collectivization of 
agriculture, cult of personality (Plamper, 1912) and subordination of interests of foreign communist 
parties to those of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, deemed by Stalin to be the leading 
vanguard party of communist revolution at the time (Bottomore, 1991; p.54). Large scale class-based 
violence, purges in the party and the populace as well as deportations of suspect or non-
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compromising people took place. Expropriation of (forced) surplus from peasants, workers, non-
Russian participants in the USSR enriched Moscow. In short, Stalin was able to bring the USSR up to 
an industrialized nation and an international power to reckon with. Some scholars argue (Suvorov, 
2008; Harrison and Davies, 1997) that Stalin foresaw inevitability of the World War II and not only he 
prepared the USSR to fight the War effectively (and perhaps, to be a victor) but also caused the War 
to commence.  Rapid rearmament in the USSR had started during the first five-year plan (1928-32).  
The second five-year plan (1933-37) was a period of exceptionally rapid change in military 
technology and the technological level of defence industry products. It was followed by a third 
period (the third five-year plan of 1938-42, interrupted by war) in which the pace of rearmament 
was again exceptionally rapid and from a much higher initial base than before (Harrison and Davies, 
1997). Indubitably, such expenses on a long-drawn preparation for war (which was an uneconomic 
allocation), establishing military-industrial complexes (Harrison, 2003) fuelled by expropriation of 
the surplus from agricultural as well as industrial sector with an opportunity cost impinging on the 
development that could enhance the wellbeing of the people.  In the Stalinist plans heavy capital 
goods industries stole the limelight and the development of consumer goods industries were 
downplayed. Rationing, queues, waiting lists, forced substitution, purchase postponement and 
outright desistence were general, frequent, intense and chronic, characterising a socialist economy 
as a shortage economy (Kornai, 1980). A true Marxist-Leninist could not indulge in luxuries (that 
were characteristic of the petit-bourgeois) and, therefore, to a Soviet consumer, a luxury item was 
any good with the exception of plain breads, cabbage, potatoes and vodka (Gronow, 2003).  
7. The Second World War and Formation of the Eastern Bloc: The World War II began in 1939. The 
Soviet Union made an attempt to form an alliance with Britain and France (Lightbody, 2004, p. 97; 
Müller and Ueberschär, 2009) but failed. So they signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Germany. 
This included a secret protocol whereby the independent countries of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, and Romania were divided into spheres of interest of the parties. The Soviet 
Union also aspired to regain the territories of West Belarus and West Ukraine, which they had lost to 
Poland in Soviet-Polish War 1919-1921. The Pact assured the supply of oil and other provisions to 
Germany as well as immunity from the attack by the USSR.  Within a short time, the Soviet Union 
occupied Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and annexed Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from 
Romania. In due course, they aspired to gain the territories now under Iraq, Iran and Bulgaria. 
However, the conflict of interest between Germany and the Soviet Union arose in Operation 
Barbarossa upon which the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact ended and the USSR joined the Allies. In due 
course, having suffered a lot of devastation, the Soviet Union was victorious in World War II, which 
ended in 1945. After the War, the Soviet Union took over the governments in Albania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania were made into republics and annexed to the Soviet Union. Finland was partly controlled 
by the Soviets.  It also took a large portion of Poland.  In the after-War years during Stalin’s Regime 
those countries remained under the effective command of the USSR.  
The Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance was a treaty signed in 1955 
establishing a mutual defence organization composed of the Soviet Union and Albania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The treaty provided for a unified 
military command and for the maintenance of Soviet military units on the territories of the other 
participating states, rendering the Governments in those states a puppet in the hands of the USSR. 
Thus, the Eastern Bloc was formed with the countries in the said Treaty. Albania came out of the 
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bloc in 1960 and the East Germany after the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The Russian dominance 
was persistently observing revolts and repressions. The command economies of the Bloc 
experienced inefficiencies and stagnation preceding the Bloc's dissolution in 1989-90. 
8. China as a socialist state: China embraced socialism in 1949. From the very beginning, under the 
leadership of Mao Zedong, socialism in China differed from the Stalinist socialism in the USSR and 
was somewhat closer to Leninism in providing freer hands to peasantry. Mao proclaimed that the 
peasants formed the essential revolutionary class in China, because, contrary to their industrial 
working ‘comrades’, they were more suited to establishing a successful revolution and socialist 
society in China.  Further, Mao gave appropriate weight to ‘cultural revolution.’ It may be noted that 
Mao Zedong had leant a lot from the experiences of the USSR.  
After Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping initiated socialist market reforms in 1978. He tried to untie 
the concepts of market economy with capitalism and planning with socialism. He argued that 
planning and market forces are the two alternative ways of controlling the economy while socialism 
and capitalism are the two ways to look at the distribution of benefit to the society. Therefore, a 
socialist market economy is a viable form of socio-economic management. Such discrimination 
reminds us of what Mill said: “The laws and conditions of the production of wealth partake of the 
character of physical truths. There is nothing optional or arbitrary in them. ... It is not so with the 
Distribution of Wealth. That is a matter of human institution solely. The things once there, mankind, 
individually or collectively, can do with them as they like. They can place them at the disposal of 
whomsoever they please, and on whatever terms (Mill, 1848; p. 199). Forging a balance between 
socialism and market economy could deliver suitable prices (since the labour theory of value cannot 
be relied upon in practice), signals, incentives and drives on the one hand and social control on 
industry and market forces could better distribute the benefits to the people on the other. China 
also supported private ownership in the sense that private ownership is antisocialist when it is 
owned solely by the bourgeoisie but not when everyone owns the means of production and hence 
cannot be exploited by others. The Chinese system is also called the state capitalism or market 
socialism (Dirlik, 1989; Huang, 2012). Whatever may be the case, as of now, China's economy is one 
of the world's largest most fast growing economy in which the public sector accounts for a bigger 
share than the private sector.  It is the global hub for manufacturing and is the largest manufacturing 
economy in the world as well as the largest exporter of goods in the world.  
9. The Case of India:  After freedom in 1947, India avoided siding with either Bloc (Eastern or 
Western) explicitly, but exhibited an inclination to the economic philosophy of the USSR. It 
proclaimed to subscribe to a socialist pattern of society and aspired to promote economic growth 
through indicative planning. The first five year plan (1951-56) focussed on the development of 
primary sector. Technological institutions were established to raise qualified manpower. Many 
irrigation projects were started and blueprints of establishment of five steel plants with international 
collaboration were finalized. In the second plan (1956-61) Feldman-Mahalanobis model (a neo-
Marxist model of development) was used for a rapid industrialization in which heavy capital goods 
industries (or basic industries) were in the domain of the public sector while other goods (mostly 
consumer goods or non-basic) industries were in the domain of the private sector. Establishment of 
firms in the industrial goods sector were to be permitted by the government and with this provision 
a control over the private sector by the bureaucracy began. The third plan (1961-66) did not perform 
well due to several contingencies. However, development of defence industry drew the attention of 
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the Government. Fertilizer and cement industries were established to boost up agriculture and 
construction sectors. During the fourth plan (1969-74) many banks were nationalized to facilitate 
financing of development in farming as well as manufacturing sectors. The fifth Plan (1974-78) 
concentrated on self reliance in agricultural production, attainment of social justice and 
development of infrastructure. Since the early 1970’s plans were viewed as economic and control 
instrument with the government directed to meet political ends rather than economic development. 
The sixth plan (1980-85) marked the beginning of liberalization or the end of Nehruvian socialism. 
The main objectives of the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1985-90) were to establish growth in areas of 
increasing economic productivity, production of food grains and generating employment through 
social justice. At the end of the seventh plan India faced economic instability and foreign exchange 
crisis. To remedy these problems India launched free market reforms and proceeded to 
liberalization, privatisation and globalization.  
10. The fall and dissolution of the USSR: The prime reason of the fall and ultimate dissolution of the 
USSR is its excessive indulgence in the activities for expanding the socialist empire in the world and 
long-drawn involvement in the cold war with the Western Bloc, even at the cost of injustice and 
misery of its own people and its constituents units. The USSR had fourteen other constituents at the 
Russian west and south-west borders. While the resources in those constituent units were exploited, 
they were given little role in decision making and only a meagre share in the dividend. There were 
huge expenses on military and maintenance of the satellite states in Eastern Europe as well the 
central Asian Republics. On the other hand, there was severe shortage of consumer items, year after 
year, knowing no end. This led to the dissatisfaction of the people. For over seventy years there was 
a single party rule which was highly authoritarian and suppressive of any antagonism whatsoever. 
There was no freedom to speak and display democratic sentiments. In the rung of administrators 
there was widespread corruption, nepotism and lack of transparency. Caplan (2004) points out that 
the fall of the Soviet Union resulted from bad incentives arising out of the one-party political system 
and degree of power granted to the party-elite. There were a lot of economic disparities among the 
constituents of the USSR and the better off among them did not appreciate paying for the 
development of the worse off units. This feeling led to development of nationalism among the 
constituent units.  Protests and up-rise in Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia, etc. 
became more frequent.  
The command economy and dictatorial regime in the USSR was failing. In view of this, Gorbachev 
brought about several economic reforms.  He also allowed elections with a multi-party system. A 
slow process of democratization began. These reforms enhanced the expectations of people of the 
constituent units - further democratization and freedom of republics were demanded -  on the one 
hand and dissatisfied many communist leaders on the other. The reforms were associated with 
shifting of the command economy closer to the market economy and, therefore, they were 
considered as a deviation from the communist policies. So was in case of democratization. Many 
communist leaders in USSR opposed reforms initiated by Gorbachev. The Fall of the Berlin Wall and 
unification of Germany also was a big blow on the USSR. Belarus and Ukraine became powerful and 
demanded exit from the Union. These factors ultimately led to the dissolution of the USSR and 
establishment of independent governments in the members of the Eastern Bloc. Thus was the end of 
the greatest socio-economic experiment in history that ventured on the establishment of a 
command economy to achieve  socialist goals and the dictatorship of the proletariat.   
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11. Victory of the market economy and globalization of the Eastern Bloc countries: The fall of USSR 
dominated empire is a victory of the market economy over the command economy (although it 
should not be construed to be the victory of capitalism over socialism as China would contend).  It is 
also a victory of democratic institutions over dictatorship that engulfed the world during 1917-91 in 
the garb of communism or socialism.  
This victory led to opening of the erstwhile member countries of the Eastern Bloc to globalization of 
their economies. They all realized that market is an impersonal arbitrator generating signals and 
incentives that may allocate resources more optimally than any other system, especial bureaucratic 
ones that are subject to various types of biases. There is no disagreement on the possibility of 
market failure, but the public intervention and indicative planning may correct such failures to a 
considerable extent.  
12. Globalization efforts of the erstwhile Eastern Bloc countries, China and India:  In what follows, 
we present the quantitative measures of the extent of globalization of the erstwhile Eastern Bloc 
countries together with China and India. China has been included in this study because of being a 
socialist country that has relied on the market forces and set an example of a spectacular success of 
socialism forged with market. India has been included because it claimed to have a socialistic pattern 
of society, relied on market forces forged with planning and public intervention, had explicitly 
adopted many techno-economic and administrative manners of the USSR in the heydays of planning 
for development as well as it had gone ahead for privatization, liberalization and globalization after 
the fall of the USSR in 1991.   
13. Quantitative measure of globalization: The KOF Index of globalization, which is the most 
comprehensive quantitative measure of globalization since 1970 for over 122 countries, visualized 
three dimensions or aspects of globalization viz. economic, social and political (Dreher, 2006; Dreher 
et al. 2008). Economic globalization has two measures: actual economic flows (such as trans-border 
trade, direct investment and portfolio investment, A1) and restrictions on trans-border trade as well 
as capital movement by means of taxation, tariff, etc, A2). Social globalization comprised three 
measures: trans-border personal contacts (degree of tourism, telecom traffic, postal interactions, 
etc, B1), flow of information (B2) and cultural proximity (B3). The political globalization (C) is 
measured by a single figure quantifying the number of embassies and high commissions in a country, 
membership of international organizations, participation in UN peace missions, and the treaties 
signed between two or more states (Mishra and Kumar, 2012; Mishra, 2017). These sub-indices (A1 
through C) are available on the KOF website. The measures A1 and A2 are synthesized to make a 
sub-index of economic globalization, A. Similarly, B1, B2 and B3 are synthesized to make a sub-index 
of social globalization, B. Finally, A, B and C are synthesized to arrive at the overall index of 
globalization. At all stages the Principal Component Analysis is used to synthesize the constituent 
variables into a more comprehensive higher level index.   
Principal Component Analysis is based on correlation (or covariance) among different constituent 
variables. It has been observed that this analysis has an inbuilt elitist bias in weight assignment that 
often downplays those variables that are poorly correlated with other sister variables favoured by 
the composite index in explaining the variance of (or maximizing the correlation with) its constituent 
variables. Since correlation does not measure importance, the principal component based synthetic 
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indices may unduly undermine the importance of poorly correlated constituent variables by either 
ignoring them or assigning them a meagre role in the synthesis (linear aggregation).  
To ameliorate the said problem of elitism, Mishra (2016; 2017) proposed a method that assigns 
weights to different constituent variables in such a manner that their Shapley values are as equitable 
as possible. Since Shapley values are mean expected marginal contributions of agents in a 
cooperative (collusive) game, such indices are almost equimarginal contribution (AEMC) indices.  
In this study, the measures of different aspects (dimensions) of globalization (A1, A2, B1, B2, B3 and 
C) are taken from KOF for the years 1991 through 2014 for 24 countries. Some countries (Belarus, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) in the erstwhile USSR and satellite states of East Europe that formed 
the Eastern Bloc are not included in want of data. India has been included in the study for 
comparison as well as the reasons mentioned earlier. To reiterate, China is a country that forged 
socialism with the market forces. India has for long proclaimed having a socialistic pattern and 
attempted development in her mixed economy with planning and market cooperating with each 
other. Method-wise, the AEMC indices are constructed by merging A1 through C at one go (as 
elaborated in Mishra, 2017). The KOF index of globalization 2017 is used for comparing the AEMC 
index of globalization. 
14. The main findings: The detailed KOF and AEMC Indices of Globalization of Eastern Bloc 
Countries, China and India 1991-2014 are presented in Appendix (Tables A.1 through A.4.). The 
AEMC index of globalization is closely correlated with the KOF index of globalization (correlation = 
0.9685; rank correlation = 0.978, Kendall’s Tau = 0.906). The AEMC is also correlated with its 
constituent variables more equitably than the KOF index (see Table-2). Thus, the AEMC index is more 
inclusive and less elitist. Further, the AEMC index minimizes the Euclidean norm of Shapley value 
contributions of constituent variables (A1 through C) to the overall (AEMC) index. This norm is 
0.408369 for the Shapley values (Table-1). As against this, the norm is  0.434282 for the KOF index.  
In Table-3 (as well as Fig.-1 and Fig.-2) we present the highest values of KOF as well as AEMC 
globalization index obtained by different countries in the recent past years. The recent past highest 
values are chosen on account of the fact that since 2008 or so different countries have taken 
different measures (A2 in particular), suitable to their particular case, to protect their economies 
from the world-wide slump. This slump has also affected their economic interaction (A1 in 
particular) with other economies in the world speaking on the globalization index. Linear trends in 
globalization indices could not have helped much in comparison across the countries since such 
trends (being gross statistical approximations due to nonlinearities present in the data) would 
conceal more than reveal.  
It is found that Tajikistan, India, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan Republic exhibit least extent of 
globalization. On this, KOF and AEMC are unanimous. Kazakhstan, Armenia, Moldova (all the three in 
the erstwhile USSR) and Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina have performed poorly in comparison to the 
Russian Federation. Georgia, Serbia and Montenegro are on either side around the median. On the 
higher side of the median, Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania (all the four in the erstwhile USSR) and 
Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Hungary (all the five satellite states in the 
non-USSR East Europe) are the performers in globalization (although their ranks vary slightly across 
the two indices of globalization). They all perform better than the Russian Federation. The Czech 
Republic and Hungary are at the top in globalization achievements.  
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Table-1: AEMC Weights and Shapley Value of different Sub-Indices of Globalization (Min Norm=0.408369) 
Sub-Indices of Globalization A1 A2 B1 B2 B3 C 
Shapley Value Shares - KOF 0.193332 0.100227 0.070154 0.198479 0.195915 0.241826 
Shapley Value Shares - AEMC 0.164386 0.165227 0.163387 0.175331 0.167237 0.164432 
Weights of Sub-Indices for AEMC 2.873287 5.24107 6.976957 0.000697 3.608586 7.767869 
. 
 
Table-2 : Correlation Coefficients among Different Sub-Indices and Indices of Globalization 
Indices A1 A2 B1 B2 B3 C KOF  AEMC 
A1 1 0.580084 0.47026 0.715588 0.438728 0.413455 0.802507 0.777523 
A2 0.580084 1 0.662041 0.584872 0.329787 0.022308 0.592247 0.716429 
B1 0.47026 0.662041 1 0.650843 0.184578 -0.04347 0.498675 0.673987 
B2 0.715588 0.584872 0.650843 1 0.400311 0.440261 0.815215 0.807413 
B3 0.438728 0.329787 0.184578 0.400311 1 0.620465 0.755171 0.706137 
C 0.413455 0.022308 -0.04347 0.440261 0.620465 1 0.748057 0.611847 
KOF 0.802507 0.592247 0.498675 0.815215 0.755171 0.748057 1 0.968476 
AEMC 0.777523 0.716429 0.673987 0.807413 0.706137 0.611847 0.968476 1 
  
 
Table-3. Countries According to Recent Maximum Value of Indices of Globalization 
Country AEMC Index AEMC Rank Country KOF Index KOF Rank PC Income * 
Tajikistan      40.53 1 Tajikistan 45.26 1 3008  
India           44.42 2 India 52.38 2 6616 
Azerbaijan      52.13 3 Azerbaijan 57.50 3 17439 
Kyrgyz_Rep      52.90 4 Kyrgyz_Rep 57.50 4 3521 
China           53.82 5 Armenia 58.89 5 8621 
Kazakhstan      56.40 6 Kazakhstan 58.97 6 25145 
Armenia         56.95 7 Albania 61.60 7 11840 
Moldova         59.58 8 China 62.02 8 15399 
Albania         61.68 9 Moldova 64.04 9 5328 
Bosnia_Herzg    62.72 10 Georgia 64.21 10 10044 
Russian_Fed     62.77 11 Montenegro 65.48 11 16643 
Georgia         64.88 12 Bosnia_Herzg 66.60 12 10958 
Serbia          64.90 13 Serbia 69.49 13 14493 
Montenegro      67.45 14 Russian_Fed 70.21 14 26490 
Ukraine         67.48 15 Ukraine 70.26 15 8305 
Latvia          73.41 16 Latvia 71.45 16 25710 
Romania         74.55 17 Romania 76.51 17 22348 
Bulgaria        74.57 18 Bulgaria 76.98 18 20327 
Lithuania       75.61 19 Lithuania 77.47 19 29972 
Poland          78.56 20 Slovenia 78.46 20  32085 
Slovenia        80.55 21 Estonia 79.27 21 29313 
Estonia         80.99 22 Poland 81.32 22 27764 
Czech_Rep       86.34 23 Czech_Rep 85.05 23 33232 
Hungary         86.99 24 Hungary 86.99 24 27482 
*Note: In  International $, IMF for 2016 Source: Wikipedia; List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita 
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There could be another classification that concludes our findings succinctly. Most of the countries to 
the south of Russian Federation (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan) have 
performed rather poorly in globalization efforts. On the other hand, the countries in the north-
western side of the Russian Federation (except Moldova) have on the whole performed better. It 
may be noted that Moldova is a landlocked country with underdeveloped agriculture and 
manufacturing sectors. Its economy is primarily based on the service sector. It is one of the poorest 
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Fig.-1. Countries According to Recent Maximum value 
of AEMC Index of Globalization
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economies in Europe. It suffered a declining condition of the economy after the dissolution of the 
USSR and the economic decline persisted for many years until 2009 or so.     
15. India among poor performers in globalization: India falls among very poor performers’ brackets, 
having Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan among its cohorts, irrespective of the index of 
globalization (KOF or AEMC). Azerbaijan is, of course, much above India according to per capita 
income (vide Table-3), but it may be noted that Tajikistan is a mountainous, landlocked country in 
Central Asia with an estimated population of 8.7 million people. Almost a half of its income comes 
from remittances that its people working abroad send home. Agriculture and industry sectors are 
underdeveloped. The economic situation is fragile, largely owing to corruption, uneven economic 
reforms, and economic mismanagement. Its per capita income is only Int$ 3008. Similarly, 
Kyrgyzstan is a landlocked country with mountainous terrain. Kyrgyzstan's terrain is mountainous, 
which accommodates livestock raising - the largest agricultural activity, so the resulting wool, meat 
and dairy products are major commodities. Main crops include wheat, sugar beets, potatoes, cotton, 
tobacco, vegetables, and fruit. As the prices of imported agrichemicals and petroleum are so high, 
much farming is being done by hand and by horse, as it was generations ago (Wikipedia, 
Kyrgyzistan). Its per capita income is Int$ 3521. Moldova is the only other country (among those 
under study) that has per capita income (Int$ 5328) less than India’s (Int$ 6616). India being a large 
country with potentials should have made more effective efforts in globalization to fight its poverty.   
 
16. Concluding remarks: Bardhan (2006) opines that appalling governance and populism combine to 
block reform and deter economic integration of India with the world. He observes that economic 
nationalism (of both leftists and the right wing politicians) has resisted inflow of large scale foreign 
investment in India. India has learnt little from the experiences of China. Poor delivery of basic social 
and infrastructural services for the poor in large parts of the country in education, health, drinking 
water and irrigation, and more cuts at the roots of the capability to sustain competition that opening 
of the economy to the world would warrant thwart the pace of globalization. Education does not go 
in for enhancement of productivity. On account of social heterogeneity and economic inequality the 
social and political environment in India is conflict-ridden. Yet, India’s corrupt governance - the soft 
state - as well as hypocritical and pseudo-socialistic entertainment of efforts to deliver social justice 
since the Nehruvian days is well-documented (Myrdal, 1973). Resistance to reforms also comes from 
the environmentalists. Bardhan concludes that the “opposition to economic reform thus reflects not 
just the lingering nostalgia for old-style Fabian socialism that the financial press likes to lampoon. 
The roots go much deeper, into the various distributive conflicts throughout Indian society.”  
Globalization in India is under a strong spell of hysteresis.  
  
The Financial Express Economic Bureau (2008) observed that India has been more restrictive than 
similar developing economies, such as Brazil, China, and Russia. Populism and electoral politics were 
the main reasons for industrial stagnation of many state economies. Acemoglu and Yared (2010) 
rightly observe that openness to trade is still a political choice. This suggests that changes in 
domestic political equilibria might introduce limits to the process of globalization. In spite of all 
proclamations, unless the political will to globalization is there, globalization cannot progress much 
further. However, such a political will has not been strong in India. India has remained protectionist 
of vested interests of politicians, industrialists, business houses and perhaps the intelligentsia 
(Rudra, 1989), a coalition of the dominant proprietary classes that benefit from the status quo 
(Bardhan, 1984) or stagnancy of the Indian economy and society.    
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Appendix 
Table-A.1. KOF and AEMC Indices of Globalization of Eastern Bloc Countries, China and India 1991-2014 
Country Armenia Azerbaijan Estonia Georgia Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Rep. 
Year KOF AEMC KOF AEMC KOF AEMC KOF AEMC KOF AEMC KOF AEMC 
1991 27.04 34.64 24.71 21.77 41.46 50.23 27.34 31.97 31.48 32.66 31.33 31.90 
1992 28.49 36.17 28.76 25.49 43.10 52.33 30.23 34.44 32.82 34.03 34.61 35.08 
1993 29.29 36.92 29.31 25.97 46.11 55.22 31.83 35.81 31.92 33.82 34.85 35.37 
1994 31.34 39.05 28.12 25.27 49.59 58.42 32.95 36.82 34.75 37.92 37.33 37.58 
1995 33.54 39.77 29.61 26.59 61.52 70.43 32.30 36.56 38.29 40.79 39.42 38.98 
1996 35.25 40.73 33.74 30.29 63.71 72.55 32.32 36.13 39.42 41.65 40.32 39.50 
1997 36.82 41.91 36.83 33.92 68.64 77.23 32.51 31.98 41.00 42.56 42.36 41.14 
1998 37.77 41.72 37.57 34.19 68.88 76.28 33.42 33.00 41.67 41.97 47.92 46.23 
1999 41.78 43.40 41.97 37.37 69.93 76.62 40.93 40.21 45.13 43.96 50.62 48.53 
2000 45.48 44.44 46.12 39.93 71.87 77.82 43.40 41.20 48.95 47.16 52.62 49.05 
2001 45.82 44.82 47.41 41.07 72.77 78.34 44.81 42.56 50.20 48.48 51.40 47.89 
2002 45.33 45.13 50.23 42.98 73.74 78.04 46.58 43.12 50.66 49.06 50.84 47.37 
2003 46.32 46.38 49.82 45.58 74.86 79.25 47.60 44.47 51.82 50.04 48.17 44.87 
2004 48.19 49.01 53.71 46.95 76.81 80.99 49.60 47.98 52.22 51.01 50.55 45.85 
2005 49.80 50.89 54.89 47.93 76.32 80.07 49.91 48.30 52.86 50.99 51.33 46.41 
2006 51.02 52.80 55.20 48.77 77.04 79.35 53.20 53.03 53.13 51.31 56.09 50.72 
2007 51.24 53.15 57.02 51.14 77.93 79.96 57.88 59.21 56.67 53.84 57.50 52.90 
2008 51.11 52.42 56.19 50.73 78.05 80.07 59.60 60.58 57.07 53.65 55.04 50.42 
2009 52.32 52.13 55.35 49.25 77.75 79.53 60.38 61.27 56.74 53.37 53.72 47.93 
2010 53.15 51.92 56.00 50.27 78.58 80.35 62.01 61.59 56.26 52.62 54.42 48.30 
2011 52.67 50.75 56.41 50.88 78.67 80.18 62.44 62.51 56.75 52.88 55.12 49.56 
2012 57.13 54.83 57.32 51.98 78.90 80.32 63.58 63.56 58.97 56.40 53.58 48.59 
2013 58.44 56.29 57.50 52.13 78.30 79.07 64.21 64.88 53.20 50.05 55.79 50.86 
2014 58.89 56.95 56.22 50.61 79.27 80.65 64.13 64.61 56.08 52.26 53.64 47.76 
.   
Table-A.2.  KOF and AEMC Indices of Globalization of Eastern Bloc Countries, China and India 1991-2014 
Country Latvia Lithuania Moldova Tajikistan Ukraine Albania 
Year KOF AEMC KOF AEMC KOF AEMC KOF AEMC KOF AEMC KOF AEMC 
1991 38.60 44.06 35.34 37.40 29.45 34.24 23.22 22.93 29.97 30.37 28.94 27.11 
1992 39.30 45.40 36.65 38.98 31.05 35.65 21.67 21.67 34.76 35.39 36.91 34.35 
1993 40.66 45.63 38.20 40.48 30.98 35.84 26.99 26.51 36.87 38.33 35.57 33.42 
1994 46.49 50.88 44.23 46.05 33.50 37.81 28.67 27.04 41.04 43.11 37.54 35.82 
1995 48.88 53.99 48.32 51.43 36.07 39.94 30.75 28.86 44.90 45.30 40.43 39.37 
1996 51.78 56.66 55.62 58.49 39.97 42.17 31.52 28.42 47.10 46.94 36.23 35.02 
1997 55.02 59.34 59.00 61.26 45.27 45.35 32.14 28.93 54.01 53.10 39.99 38.92 
1998 56.07 60.56 60.30 62.78 48.90 46.94 32.29 29.06 55.69 53.87 40.92 39.72 
1999 57.27 62.02 61.19 63.92 49.65 46.64 33.58 29.99 57.87 55.79 39.16 39.24 
2000 57.32 62.48 62.84 64.76 52.29 48.28 34.53 29.92 60.51 58.48 40.01 40.57 
2001 58.16 63.48 64.21 65.61 52.25 47.76 33.98 29.45 59.16 56.53 44.69 45.49 
2002 59.33 63.90 65.72 66.75 52.55 47.90 34.86 30.54 59.38 57.16 48.49 48.83 
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2003 60.39 64.30 67.14 67.55 58.40 53.57 36.76 32.57 60.03 57.56 46.12 46.68 
2004 65.75 67.96 69.43 69.62 58.44 54.51 35.48 31.44 61.33 59.03 43.30 45.19 
2005 66.94 69.60 69.88 69.85 57.84 54.53 35.19 30.92 62.86 61.13 47.19 48.44 
2006 68.77 70.52 70.89 70.00 61.13 57.27 37.21 31.69 63.45 61.69 51.18 51.18 
2007 69.54 72.16 72.81 72.00 64.04 59.58 38.00 32.31 65.43 63.35 54.87 54.70 
2008 68.92 71.43 72.23 71.39 63.40 59.15 42.00 36.48 66.53 64.66 57.98 57.72 
2009 65.55 68.64 68.52 67.37 62.08 56.77 41.82 36.17 68.25 65.50 61.60 61.68 
2010 68.90 70.86 71.77 69.49 61.81 56.49 42.51 36.83 67.70 64.41 61.41 60.93 
2011 69.59 71.51 72.88 70.95 62.62 56.98 43.23 37.75 68.29 65.05 58.11 57.17 
2012 70.53 71.27 72.53 70.46 61.71 56.22 45.26 40.53 69.07 66.22 54.29 53.57 
2013 70.27 71.15 77.08 74.16 61.63 55.67 43.39 37.35 70.26 67.48 57.00 55.62 
2014 71.45 73.41 77.47 75.61 61.39 55.64 42.87 37.29 70.24 66.36 60.65 60.61 
.  
Table-A.3.  KOF and AEMC Indices of Globalization of Eastern Bloc Countries, China and India 1991-2014 
Country Bulgaria Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Romania Bosnia&Herzg 
Year KOF AEMC KOF AEMC KOF AEMC KOF AEMC KOF AEMC KOF AEMC 
1991 37.60 36.31 64.56 66.22 62.18 66.86 53.13 54.42 36.31 35.80 24.78 22.86 
1992 44.99 43.20 64.56 66.22 65.91 68.99 59.00 58.87 37.31 37.07 24.78 22.86 
1993 45.81 44.57 64.56 66.22 69.11 71.98 62.34 61.93 38.71 38.53 29.08 27.31 
1994 46.82 44.62 66.94 68.62 72.34 75.12 63.00 61.70 41.94 40.86 29.71 28.03 
1995 53.93 50.85 69.84 72.17 74.98 76.52 65.26 63.33 47.42 45.06 30.33 29.51 
1996 57.71 54.06 71.00 72.76 76.99 78.79 66.28 64.74 50.48 48.09 32.33 34.16 
1997 58.06 55.39 73.71 74.89 79.13 79.82 68.47 67.57 53.93 50.77 35.03 37.45 
1998 58.89 56.97 74.70 76.40 80.90 81.09 71.22 70.32 55.74 53.24 36.84 38.83 
1999 63.29 60.78 76.74 78.79 82.11 82.60 72.23 71.92 57.83 55.72 40.54 41.66 
2000 66.20 63.03 78.79 80.69 82.34 83.47 73.51 74.23 62.48 59.40 46.89 47.30 
2001 63.71 58.79 79.24 80.12 82.19 83.11 70.96 70.03 59.54 55.85 49.94 48.13 
2002 63.27 57.43 80.23 81.44 81.33 81.86 72.26 71.00 61.65 57.08 51.10 48.43 
2003 65.40 59.75 80.46 81.22 81.66 81.96 74.06 72.76 62.27 58.31 52.44 49.57 
2004 68.18 64.11 83.06 84.50 85.35 86.73 79.71 77.95 65.24 61.29 54.59 51.38 
2005 66.74 62.30 83.57 85.08 85.16 86.14 78.01 76.06 66.59 63.80 54.61 50.21 
2006 70.56 66.25 83.79 84.41 86.55 86.55 79.67 77.08 66.50 62.08 60.38 58.43 
2007 73.85 69.79 85.05 86.30 86.61 86.74 81.15 78.51 75.81 73.66 61.30 59.04 
2008 73.06 69.05 84.37 86.34 86.51 86.48 79.82 77.69 74.92 73.33 60.09 56.39 
2009 71.09 67.51 84.10 85.36 86.99 86.99 80.45 77.37 74.40 72.92 60.28 57.34 
2010 70.59 67.96 83.80 84.57 86.74 86.87 79.46 76.16 73.51 71.74 61.77 59.03 
2011 70.29 67.93 83.16 83.36 86.05 85.79 78.67 75.06 72.65 69.92 66.60 62.72 
2012 75.57 72.44 83.72 84.09 85.85 85.19 79.38 75.70 74.09 70.49 66.53 62.12 
2013 76.98 74.29 83.16 83.53 85.84 85.41 80.34 76.85 75.29 72.02 66.12 61.54 
2014 76.89 74.57 84.88 86.24 86.55 86.83 81.32 78.56 76.51 74.55 66.56 62.33 
.    
Table-A.4.  KOF and AEMC Indices of Globalization of Eastern Bloc Countries, China and India 1991-2014 
Country Montenegro Serbia Slovenia Russian Fed. China India 
Year KOF AEMC KOF AEMC KOF AEMC KOF AEMC KOF AEMC KOF AEMC 
1991 53.42 55.23 45.38 49.25 40.02 45.53 42.74 39.83 38.29 33.12 31.92 27.84 
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1992 53.42 55.23 45.75 50.22 43.50 49.21 46.27 42.86 39.80 34.35 33.43 29.46 
1993 53.42 55.23 45.69 50.52 47.59 53.04 50.50 47.59 41.12 35.61 34.91 30.71 
1994 53.42 55.23 41.55 46.59 51.08 57.34 51.50 48.15 41.46 36.04 35.66 31.27 
1995 53.42 55.23 41.72 46.99 52.85 59.34 53.94 50.37 43.97 37.58 37.34 32.06 
1996 53.42 55.23 42.28 47.43 58.04 62.01 54.74 50.29 44.89 38.22 41.34 35.45 
1997 53.42 55.23 42.51 47.53 64.16 68.32 56.02 50.97 45.94 39.04 41.75 35.61 
1998 53.42 55.23 43.17 48.05 65.92 70.29 58.20 51.75 52.09 43.83 42.50 35.98 
1999 53.42 55.23 41.31 44.51 66.44 71.26 58.35 52.74 54.21 45.66 43.20 36.52 
2000 53.42 55.23 44.29 46.34 67.93 72.88 64.49 57.50 56.35 48.53 44.54 37.60 
2001 53.42 55.23 45.46 47.31 67.51 70.29 67.00 59.06 57.16 49.11 45.24 38.17 
2002 53.93 55.59 51.63 53.49 68.30 71.00 68.60 61.30 55.72 46.31 45.84 38.49 
2003 53.77 55.48 54.82 56.06 70.94 74.67 69.61 61.56 56.67 47.71 46.80 39.78 
2004 52.92 54.86 55.84 55.69 74.71 78.52 69.16 61.85 58.88 51.01 46.98 39.86 
2005 53.93 55.59 52.32 51.36 74.72 78.48 69.32 62.02 60.85 53.07 48.89 42.34 
2006 54.13 55.70 61.29 58.66 75.82 78.63 69.43 61.13 60.31 51.47 50.22 42.24 
2007 57.31 60.42 63.23 60.75 78.18 80.37 70.21 62.05 61.32 53.16 51.38 43.64 
2008 58.26 62.29 63.14 60.52 78.46 80.55 67.50 59.20 60.27 52.06 51.05 43.65 
2009 60.18 64.55 62.92 60.18 76.79 78.83 69.35 60.97 60.57 52.39 50.94 43.31 
2010 60.46 64.15 63.84 60.47 76.64 78.50 68.58 61.82 61.05 52.16 51.15 43.25 
2011 65.48 67.45 65.07 60.98 76.55 77.76 67.63 61.14 60.35 50.96 51.29 43.18 
2012 64.54 65.62 67.15 62.59 76.18 76.90 68.14 61.86 60.42 51.23 51.80 43.57 
2013 65.26 65.52 68.49 64.01 76.00 76.92 68.88 62.77 61.14 52.42 51.51 43.09 
2014 64.59 64.18 69.49 64.90 76.91 78.94 68.25 61.90 62.02 53.82 52.38 44.42 
 
 
